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A Stark Contrast To Congressional Intent

INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Congress added Section 1877 (the Medicare Stark Law) to the Medicare

chapter of the Social Security Act (SSA). 1 As originally enacted, the law prohibited
clinical laboratories receiving reimbursement from Medicare from making selfreferrals. 2 Shortly thereafter, in 1993, Congress extended the self-referral prohibition
to all physicians receiving reimbursement from Medicare. 3 In the same legislation,
Congress added section 1903(s) of the SSA (the Medicaid Stark Law), which provided
that the federal government would no longer reimburse state Medicaid programs for
expenditures made to self-referring physicians. 4 In 1998, the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid (CMS) issued a proposed rule providing that state Medicaid programs could
use state funds to reimburse self-referring physicians, even if by doing so, they would
lose federal funds. 5 CMS, however, chose not to finalize this portion of the proposed rule.
The Medicaid Stark laws have generated two related and controversial issues. First,
despite CMS 's proposed rule saying otherwise, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
individual relators 6 have attempted to utilize the Medicaid Stark Law to sanction
individual Medicaid physicians who make self-referrals. Second, relators have premised
Medicaid Stark Law violations as a basis for an action under the False Claims Act (FCA) 7
even though the Medicaid Stark Law does not include an express private right of action. 8
These issues raise important policy considerations. First and foremost, they ask whether
an administrative agency - CMS - or the courts are more qualified to interpret the
Medicaid Stark law. This question must weigh the administrative agency's clarity,
uniformity, and expertise against the judiciary's ability to interpret the law. This
policy consideration will be interwoven throughout the discussion in this Article and
specifically addressed in its recommendations provided in Part IV
Part I of this Article will introduce the applicable regulatory framework and CMS 's
proposed rule from 1998. Part II will review the four district court opinions whose
holdings directly contravene CMS 's proposed rule, and thereafter, discusses the many
issues surrounding the FCA jurisprudence. Part III will address the use of the FCA
to bring Stark Law violations and how it conflicts with congressional intent. Part IV
will discuss how conflicting interpretation of the Stark Law challenges the healthcare
industry. Part IV will then make several recommendations about how the healthcare

1

42 US.C. § 1395nn (2012).
42 US.C. § 1395nn. See also JENNIFER O'SuLLlVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32494, MEDICARE:

when he or she refers a
in which he or she has a financial interest,
defined as
investment, or a 1,,v111µ<01rn.1uLm arrangement with the
3

See 42 US.C. § 1395nn (2012).

4

Id.

5

Medicare and Medicaid Programs;
Referrals to Health Care Entities With
Have Financial
63 Fed. Reg. 1704
January 9, 1998).

6

See BLACK' s LAW DrcnONARY 1403
ed. 2009)
a rela1or as "a person who furnishes
information on which a civil or criminal case is based; an informer").

7

31 US.C. §§ 3729-33.

8

See

False Claims Act, 31 US.C. §§ 3729--33 (2015).
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industry and CMS can resolve these open issues. Finally, Part IV will urge the courts to
stay or dismiss any further cases under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Regulatory Framework of the Stark Laws
The Medicare and Medicaid programs differ in both function and design. Although
Medicare and Medicaid were both implemented to mitigate the effects of a general
lack of affordable health care across the United States, 9 they serve entirely different
purposes 10 and each is afforded their own statutory scheme. 11
For example, Medicare is an entirely federal program that provides federal funds to
participating health care organizations in exchange for rendering a range of medical
services to Americans age 65 and older and to younger people with certain disabilities or
health conditions. 12 Medicaid, on the other hand, simply offers an incentive to the States
to implement their own health insurance programs for the benefit of underprivileged
citizens. 13 If a state chooses to participate in Medicaid, the state partially funds its
program, but receives the rest of its funding from the federal government so long as it
complies with certain "conditions ofparticipation." 14 If the state does not accept federal

9

See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (stating
that both programs were created "to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged ... with
a supplementary medical benefits program and an expanded program of medical assistance, to
increase benefits ... [and] to improve the Federal-State public assistance programs").
10

Id.

11

Medicare was enacted under Subchapter XVIII of Title 42, Chapter 7 of the Social Security Act
and codified at 42 US.C. § 1395. Medicaid was enacted under subchapter XIX of Title 42, Chapter
7 of the Social Security Act and codified at 42 US.C. § 1396.
12
These payments either come directly from the federal government or come through fiscal
intermediaries such as insurance companies. Federal Medicare disbursements occur on a periodic
basis, often in advance of a provider rendering services. The funds disbursed are calculated based
on information provided to HHS by Medicare providers. See US. ex rel. Schubert v. All Children's
Health Sys., No. 8: ll-cv-01687-T-27-EAJ, 2013 WL 6054803, at *4 (M.D. Fla., November 15,
2013).
13

Supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.

14

The percentage varies by state. On average, States receive 57% of program expenditures from
the federal government. The reimbursement is otherwise known as the Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage (FMAP) and is determined annually for each State based on a formula that compares a
States' average per capita income level with the national average income level. See Medicaid: By
Topic: Financing & Reimbursement, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/
by-topics/financing-and-reimbursement/financing-and-reimbursement.html (last visited Jan. 3,
2016) (hereinafter Medicaid Financing & Reimbursement). The federal payment to the State
is referred to as "federal financial participation" or "FFP"; however, the name reimbursement
is somewhat misleading because the stream of revenue is actually a series of quarterly advance
payments that are based on the State's estimate of its anticipated future expenditures. The estimates
are periodically adjusted to reflect actual experience. In addition, the Secretary of HHS may
disallow reimbursement for "any item or class of items" if she believes that a State's expenditures
do not comply with either the Act or CMS regulations. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 US. 879,
883-85 (1988).
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Medicaid funding, it can establish an entirely state-run health insurance program or
none at all. 15
Congress recognized the above-mentioned differences between Medicare and Medicaid
programs when it enacted the Stark Laws. For instance, in enacting the Medicare Stark
Law, Congress prohibited physicians from making self-referrals and created severe
penalties for those who do so. 16 But Congress placed the Medicare Stark Law in the
Medicare subchapter, and the Medicaid Stark Law in the Medicaid subchapter, within
the United States Code. 17 This separate placement demonstrates that Congress did not
mean for the Medicare Stark Law to apply to Medicaid providers.
Instead, Congress enacted the separate Medicaid Stark Law to regulate state Medicaid
programs. 18 In passing that law, Congress was not focused directly on physicians, rather,
its sole intent was to prohibit the federal government from making payments to state
Medicaid programs that reimburse self-referring physicians. 19
B. CMS's Proposed Rule

CMS agreed that based on its plain language, the Medicaid Stark Law only restricted the
federal government's payment to each state, but did not prevent each state from using
its own funds to reimburse physicians, even those who engaged in self-referrals. 20 In
1998, CMS's predecessor, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), issued a
proposed rule to implement the Medicaid Stark Law's federal reimbursement restriction
and reporting requirements, which provided:
[W]edonotbelievetheserulesandsanctionsapplytophysiciansandproviderswhen
thereferralinvolvesMedicaidservices. Thefirstpartof[the Medicaid Stark Law] ...
is strictly an FFP provision. It imposes a requirement on the Secretary to review
a Medicaid claim, as if it were under Medicare, and deny FFP if a referral
would result in the denial of payment under Medicare. [The Medicaid Stark
Law] does not, forthe most part, make [the Medicare Stark Law] that govern[s]
15

See Medicaid Financing & Reimbursement, supra note 14.

16

See 42 US.C. § 1395nn (2012). Violators of the Medicare Stark law may be denied payment for
relevant services and have to repay any Medicare fonds received in connection with the violation.
In addition, the physician may incur civil monetary penalties of up to $15,000 per claim plus three
times the amount of the improper payment for a claim that a person knew or should have known
was improper. Moreover, the physician may be excluded from participation in all federal health care
programs. See JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22743, HEALTH CARE FRt<.UD AND ABUSE
LAWS AFFECTING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW 6 (2014).
17
See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting the Medicaid Stark Law's separate placement
in the US. Code).

18

Lama Laernmle-Weidenfeld & Amy Kaufman, The Intersection
Stark Law and Medicaid
in a
Quagmire,AHLA CONNECTIONS 16, 17 (May 2013).

Claims:

19
The Medicaid Stark law is codified in the subchapter titled "Payment to States" of the Social
Security Act. See 42 US.C.
("No payment shall be made to a State ... for expenditures
for medical ... service[ s] ... furnished to an individual on the basis of a referral that would result in
the denial of payment for the service under [the Medicare subchapter] if such subchapter
for coverage of such service to the same extent and under the same terms and conditions as under
the State
20

See Laemmle-Weidenfeld & Kaufman, supra note 18.
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the actions of Medicare physicians and providers of designated health services
apply directly to Medicaid physicians and providers. As such, these individuals
and entities are not precluded from referring Medicaid patients or from billing
for designated health services. A State may pay for these services, but cannot
receive FFP for them. However, States are free to establish their own sanctions
for situations in which physicians refer to related entities. 21
In other words, in its proposed rule, CMS 's predecessor stated that the Medicare Stark
Law was not intended to extend its self-referral prohibition to Medicaid, but rather, to
ensure that federal dollars were not being used to fund Medicaid providers who made
the same type of self-referrals that are prohibited under Medicare. 22
Additionally, CMS 's predecessor clarified that physicians must report their financial
relationships to the States, who would then determine whether to take any action. 23
CMS concluded that the requirement was on the States to determine whether a physician
has a financial relationship with an entity because it was the States who were at risk of
losing FFP. 24
In the end, however, CMS failed to finalize the Medicaid Stark Law regulations. 25
Instead, CMS issued a three-phase final rule that addressed various provisions of the
SSA (including reporting requirements of the Medicare Stark Law). In 2001, CMS
issued Phase I of its final rule but stated that it intended to address the Medicaid Stark
Law in the following Phase. 26 But the 2004 Phase II rule again failed to address that law
and reserved the issue for future rulemaking. 27 Phase III did not include any discussion
regarding the Medicaid Stark Law. 28
As a result, the healthcare community (and its legal counsel) did not believe that
Medicaid physicians were at risk oflosing state Medicaid payments for self-referrals or
were required to report financial relationships to state Medicaid programs or to CMS. 29
21

Medicare and Medicaid Programs;
Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which
Have Financial
63 Fed. Reg. 1704 (proposed January 9, l 998).

and lvledicaid Claims, GEORGIA HEALTH
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 8, 8-9 (Fall 2014), http://www.gabar.org/committeesprogramssections/sections/
healthlaw/upload/Health_Law_Section_Newsletter_Fall_2014.pdf (discussing the law's limited
application to Medicaid claims).
22

23

24
25

63 Fed. Reg. 1704, 1705.
Id.
Grubman, supra note 22 at 9-10.

26

See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which
They Have Financial Relationships, 66 Fed. Reg., 939 (proposed Jan. 4, 2001).
27
See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which
They Have Financial Relationships (Phase II) 69 Fed. Reg. 16055 (March 26, 2004).
28

See Laura Laemmle-Weidenfeld, Courts 'Acceptance
Cases
Further, AHLA CONNECTIONS 1, 8 (November 2014).

in Medicaid

29
Id. at 2; see also Megan Phillips, Recent
Is the Medicaid
zone
coming to an end?, HEALTHCARE LAW INSIGHTS (May 30, 2014 ), http://w-V\TW.healthcarelawinsights.
com/2014/05/30/recent-stark-law-developments-is-the-medicaid-comfort-zone-coming-to-an-end
visited Jan. 3, 2016) (discussing recent comi decisions suggesting that a Medicaid Stark Law
violation may also be a False Claims Act violation).
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At the very most, health lawyers believed state Medicaid programs that did not develop
their own systems for providers to report potential or admitted self-referrals were at
risk oflosing federal funding. 30 Even that assumption was downplayed, since CMS has
never restricted federal funding for a Medicaid provider's violation of Medicaid Stark
law. 31 Over a decade later, however, four district courts ruled otherwise.

II. THE JUDICIARY'S CONTRIBUTION
Prior to discussing the four district court cases, the first Section of Part II will introduce
the federal False Claims Act. The second Section of Part II will discuss the four district
court cases.
A. Introduction to the federal False Claims Act

The federal False Claims Act (FCA) 32 is one of the most important and widely used
government anti-fraud tools, inside and outside the healthcare context. 33 The FCA
imposes civil liability on a person who knowingly submits, or causes someone else to
submit, a false or fraudulent claim to the federal government. 34 Under the FCA's qui tam
provision, 35 either the Department of Justice (DOJ) or a relator may bring a civil false
claim action against the person responsible for the false claim in federal district court. 36
The qui tam provision awards a successful relator with a share of the trebled penalties
and damages recovered from the defendants, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees. 37
The DOJ may, but is not required, to intervene and take over prosecution of the claim. 38
Whether the DOJ or a relator brings the action, they must prove: (1) that the defendant
submitted or caused a third party to submit a "claim" to the government; (2) that the

30

See Laemmle-Weidenfeld, supra note 28 at 11 (noting that although Stark Law reporting
requirements have been extended to Medicaid, CMS has failed to issue a rule clarifying what is and
what is not eligible for federal funding).
31
See Grubman, supra note 22 (proclaiming that "CMS has never held that Stark's self-referral
prohibition applies to Medicaid").
32

31 US.C §§ 3729-33.

33

See STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 16 at 8 (explaining that "[t]he FCA is a law
of general applicability that is invoked frequently in the health care context"); see also Marc S.
Raspanti et aL, Who is Enforcing the Stark Law
United States? AHLA CONNECTIONS 26
(September 2012) (stating that the federal government recovers $15 for every $1 invested in FCA
healthcare investigations and prosecutions and recovered over $34 billion between 1986 and 2012).
34

31 US.C § 3729.

35

See BLACK'S LAW DrcnONARY 1251 (7th ed. 1999)(providing that qui tam is derived from the
Latin phrase "qui tam pro domingo rege quam pro si ipso in
sequitur," which translates as
"who sues on behalf of the king as well as for himself").
36

31 US.C. §3730.

37

31 US.C. §3730; see also Dayna Bowen Matthew, Tainted Prosecution of Tainted Claims: The
Law, Economics, and Ethics ofFighting Medical Fraud Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 IND.
LJ 525, 528 (2001) (explaining that "in medical fraud cases, the plaintiff's share of the potential
recoveries represents a virtual lottery jaclqiot since trebled penalties and damages accrue for each
allegedly tainted patient bill submitted to the govenrment").
38

Raspanti, supra note 33 at 26.
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claim was false or fraudulent; and (3) that the defendant knew it was false or fraudulent. 39
In regards to the second element, whether the claim was false or fraudulent, courts
separate "false" claims into two distinct categories: factually false and legally false. 40
An example of a factually false claim is where a health provider submits a claim to the
federal government for services never actually performed. 41 In contrast, a legally false
claim might arise ifthe provider violates an underlying legal obligation under a statute,
regulation, or contractual provision but certifies compliance with that obligation. 42
A legally false claim depends on the provider certifying compliance with a legal
obligation. 43 It is fairly well-established that a provider may be found liable for expressly
certifying, i.e., on a form or invoice submitted to the government, compliance with a legal
obligation that the provider did not actually make. 44 However, a smaller number of courts
also accept the implied false certification theory. 45 Under this theory, the court must infer
that a defendant certified his compliance with a law based on the facts and circumstances
of the situation. 46 The federal circuits are split on at least two issues relevant to the false
certification theory. First, not all circuits recognize the implied certification theory. 47
Second, the circuits that recognize the implied certification theory do not agree on the
appropriate nexus between the violation and the government's payment. 48
39

Lisa Michelle Phelps, Calling Off the Bounty Hunters: Discrediting the Use ofAllegedAntiKickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims Actions, 51 VAND. L. REv 1003, 1008 (1998).

40

Thomas S. Crane & Brian P Dunphy, Will the Supreme Court Weigh in? Implied Certification
Theory Under the False Claims Act, HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT DEFENSE ADVISORY (Mintz Levin),
October 17, 2011, https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2011/Advisories/1428-1011-NAT-HCED/web.
htm.

41

Id.

42

Id. Implicating the FCA through a violation of a separate regulation, statute, or law is sometimes
described as a "tainted claim." See Matthew, supra note 37, at 533 (stating "[u]nder the taintedclaims theory, the plaintiff does not allege the claim for payment itself is false or fraudulent, but
rather the falsity or fraud is supplied by the 'taint' of an entirely separate, underlying violation" of a
separate regulation, statute, or law).
43

Crane & Dunphy, supra note 40.

44

Id. ("[E]xpress certification means that the party submitting the claim ... affirmatively certified
compliance with a law.").

45

Id. ("Implied certification means that a party had an ongoing obligation to comply with a law
irrespective of whether the party submitting the claim made a direct certification of compliance.").
The implied certification theory grew out of the 1986 amendments to the FCA, which lowered the
Act's scienter requirement from "knowing" to "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" for
the truth. After the amendment, a court could more easily infer an implied duty to comply with all
applicable federal laws, regulations, rules, and procedures without direct evidence that the defendant
knowingly violated the law. Phelps, supra note 3 9, at 1015.
46

Crane & Dunphy, supra note 40.

47

The Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and the DC Circuit Courts recognize implied
certification; the remaining Circuit Courts only recognize the express certification theory. Id.

48

The standard used in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuit Courts require a claim to violate
an express prerequisite to payment in order for the claim to be false under the FCA. See Mikes
v. Straus, 27 4 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[I]mplied false certification is appropriately applied
only when the underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly states the
provider must comply in order to be paid."); United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group,
Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 309 (3rd Cir. 2011) ("[P]laintiffmust show that compliance with the regulation
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All of the circuits, however, recognize the false certification theory within the context
of the SSA, especially for violations based on the Anti-Kickback Statute. 49 On the other
hand, the DOJ or relators rarely allege an FCA claim based on the Stark law violations. 50
In an even more rare scenario, the four district court cases discussed in this next Section
were the first cases to discuss the Medicaid Stark law as a basis for an FCA claim. 51
B. The Four District Court Cases

The four district court cases all took place around the same time, and three of them
took place in the same circuit. United States ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Medical
Center5 2 was the first case to address the Medicaid Stark law issues. In Halifax, the
DOJ and relator alleged that the defendants violated Stark law by engaging in financial

which the defendant allegedly violated was a condition of payment from the Government"); United
States ex rel. Chesbrough v. VPA, PC., 655 F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[O]nly when compliance
is a prerequisite to obtaining payment"); United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg. Health Ctr.,
Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008) (echoing the "prerequisite to the government's payment"
standard). The DC and Eleventh Circuit Courts do not require the underlying violation oflaw to
be a precondition of payment. See United States v. Sci. Apps. Int Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (holding that non-compliance with contract terms may give rise to false or fraudulent
claims, even ifthe contract does not specify that compliance with the contract term is a condition
of payment); McNutt ex rel. United States v. Haleyville Med. Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256, 1259
(11th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has not expressly decided the standard to use, but has adopted
the implied certification theory. See Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th
Cir. 2010). The First Circuit requires a claim to misrepresent compliance with a material condition
for payment. See State of New York v. Amgen Inc., 652 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that
claims must represent "compliance with a material precondition of Medicaid payment").
49

Congress, in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, codified using the Anti-Kickback Statute
as a basis for an FCA claim; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text.
50

See Raspanti, supra note 33 (explaining that "the government has not utilized the FCA
extensively to enforce the Stark Law"); Matthew Solomson & Donielle McCutcheon, Fourth Circuit
Vacates and Remands Jury Verdict on Stark Violations in FCA Case, ORIGINAL SOURCE: FALSE CLAIMS
ACT ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION, April 5, 2012, http://fcablog.sidley.com/fourth-circuit-vacatesand-remands-jury-verdict-on-stark-violations-in-fca-case/ ("Stark Law rarely forms the basis of a
[FCA] action."). With the exception of the four district court cases discussed in this article, the cases
that discuss Stark violations as a basis for an FCA action focus on the Medicare Stark law violations
only. See, e.g., Thompson v. Colun1bia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. l 997); U.S. ex
rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMS, Inc., 554 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2009). Implicating the FCA through Stark
violations are usually predicated on the theory that "the provider engaged in a prohibited financial
relationship with a physician, improperly received referrals from that physician, improperly billed
Medicare for such referrals, and improperly received Medicare reimbursement pursuant to those
referrals." See Laemmle-Weidenfeld & Kaufman, supra note 18. Despite the courts' acceptance, the
use of the Medicare Stark law as a basis for an FCA claim is not without controversy though. See
Matthew, supra note 37, at 55 (questioning "whether the FCA generally, and the qui tam provision
specifically is, in fact, an appropriate enforcement vehicle for violations of the medical antifraud
statutes .... "Even the U.S. Supreme Court has directly contradicted itself on this issue.").
51

U.S. ex rel. Schubert v. All Children's Health Sys., No. 8: 11-cv-1687-T-27EAJ, 2013 WL
1651811 (M.D. Fla. 2013); U.S. ex rel. Parikh v. Citizens Med. Ctr., 977 F. Supp. 2d 654 (S.D. Tex
2013); U.S. ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv-1002-0rl-3 lDAB, 2012 WL
921147 (M.D. Fla. 2012); U.S. ex rel. Osheroffv. Tenet Healthcare Corp., No. 09-22253-CIV, 2012
WL 2871264 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
52

Halifax, 2012 WL 921147 (M.D. Fla. 2012).

8
Health Law & Policy Brief• Volume 10, Issue 1 • Winter 2016

relationships with a number of physicians and by submitting false claims to the Florida
Medicaid program. 53 The court, ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss, held that
the government had sufficiently stated a claim that the defendants, by making selfreferrals and then submitting claims to the Florida Medicaid program, had caused the
state of Florida to submit false claims to the federal government. 54
There are two notable aspects about this case. First, the court did not hold that Medicaid
Stark law prohibits self-referring Medicaid physicians from submitting claims or
receiving funds from Florida Medicaid. Instead, the court held that Medicaid Stark
law prohibits the federal government from paying a State for services rendered by selfreferring physicians, and by submitting a claim to the Florida Medicaid program, the
defendants effectively caused the Florida Medicaid program to submit false claims to the
federal government. 55 In other words, the false claims were the claims made by the State
program to the federal government, and the defendants caused those claims to be made.
Second, the court simply concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the
defendants falsely certified compliance with Medicaid Stark. 56 The court did not address
whether the defendants explicitly or impliedly certified compliance, nor did the court
address any other element of an FCA action. The court stated that to survive a motion
to dismiss, the plaintiff (in this case the government) only needed to generally allege the
elements of the action. 57 The parties later settled.
A year later in United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Tenet Healthcare Corporation, 58 the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida provided more reasoning
before finding that the qui tam relator had sufficiently alleged that the defendant
falsely certified compliance with Medicaid Stark law. In this case, even though the
DOJ declined to intervene, the court found that the qui tam relator might be able
to prove that Tenet impliedly certified compliance with the Medicaid Stark law by
submitting annual cost reports (with no express language contained within) to the
Florida Medicaid program. 59 Although the court pointed to the cost reports, it did
not fully explain how Tenet might have certified compliance with the Medicaid Stark
law. 60 The parties subsequently settled.
53

Id. at *1.

54

Id. at *3-4.

55

Id. at *4.

56

Id. at *3.
that the defendant committed fraud,

58

2013 WL 1289260 (S.D. Fla. 2013).

59

The court determined that Tenet certified cm:rip1:tam;e with the Medicaid Stark law
its
Agreement and submission of annual cost reports, and that such representatHm
were
to
a claim under the False Claims Act." The court reasoned that "because .
cost reports submitted to Medicare can form the basis for
under the False Claims Act, the
comt arrives at the same conclusion
the cost reports submitted to Medicaid, in
of the
fact that Medicaid relies on the
made in the Medicare cost report." See Tenet, 2013
WL 1289260 at *7 n.4.
60 Id.
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One year later, in United States ex rel. Parikh v. Citizens Medical Center, 61 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas similarly concluded that the Medicaid Stark law
could reasonably support an FCA claim. 62 There are two interesting aspects about this
case. First, the court concluded that the defendant may have certified compliance with
Medicaid Stark law by submitting certain Medicare forms to the federal govemment. 63
It is possible that the district court decided that it was not necessary to conclude whether
the defendant certified with Medicare Stark law or Medicaid Stark law while reviewing
a motion to dismiss. Second, the district court was operating under the false certification
theory, which its reviewing court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, later rejected
in a different case. 64 Therefore, it is more likely that future defendants facing similar
charges of implied false certification will be able to persuade courts to grant their l 2(b)
(6) motions to dismiss. Nevertheless, this case also settled.
Finally, in United States ex rel. Schubert v. All Children s Health System, 65 the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida was the first to provide a thorough
discussion of CMS 's proposed rule. The court reasoned that a "rule proposed, but
never finally adopted, has no binding force, especially when it conflicts with the plain
language of the statute conferring legislative authority." 66 The court, instead, concluded
that CMS's proposed rule has persuasive value only. 67
The court was willing to apply some value to a proposed rule. It concluded, however,
that the proposed rule suggested that the Medicaid Stark law prohibits CMS from
paying FFP to a State. Therefore, if a provider caused the state to submit false claims
to the federal government, the provider would also violate the Medicaid Stark Law. 68
The court concluded that "compliance with the Stark Amendment is undoubtedly a
prerequisite to the government's payment," but did not provide any additional reasoning
for that conclusion. 69
The court also summarily dismissed many of the defendant's arguments. Specifically,
the defendant argued that the Medicaid claims could not be false because the law and
regulations that applied to the defendant's conduct were "exceptionally ambiguous,"
and FCA cases "cannot be predicated on the alleged violation of any ambiguous law
or regulation that has not been subsequently clarified."70 The court agreed with this
proposition and stated that a "claim cannot be knowingly false if it is based on what

61

977 F Supp.

62

Id.

654, 666 (SD Tex 2013).

666.

how Citizens
certified a number of different forms,
agreements, Medicare emolhnent
Form CMS 855-As). Like
many of these cases, the
at issue
in both Medicare and Medicaid.
\ vApm"'"'b

64

United States

65

2013 WL 6054803 (J'v1.D. Fla. 2013).

66

Id. at *6.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F3d 262

Cfr

at *8.

70
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a defendant believes to be a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute." 71 The
court, however, rejected that the statute was sufficiently ambiguous to dismiss the
relator's claim. 72 This case later settled as well.
In summary, the four district courts, although with somewhat different reasoning, all
determined that Medicaid Stark law could serve as a basis for an FCA claim. The
courts made this determination despite the overall consensus that the Medicaid Stark
law does not prohibit physicians from submitting claims or receiving money with the
States. Instead, the courts determined that the Medicaid providers caused the State
Medicaid program to submit false claims to the government because the government
was prohibited from paying the States for self-referrals. There is no telling what the
definitive outcomes of these cases would have been if they went to trial; however, it is
certain that the fact-finder would have considered the factual allegations of knowledge,
falsity, and causation in much more detail. The courts, however, determined that the
plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the elements of the FCA claim to survive the defendants'
motions to dismiss. This scenario, however, is precisely why the FCA extensive reach is
so troubling, and is the topic of the next Section.
C. Irrational Breadth of Prosecutorial Discretion

The intended reach of the FCA is hotly debated, and even the Supreme Court has had
a difficult time expressing its limits. 73 Inevitably, the circuits do not agree on the FCA's
boundaries either, especially in regards to whether and to what extent there should be a
nexus between the violation of a law and the government's payment. 74 Notwithstanding
these jurisdictional differences, the "tainted-claims" doctrine is deeply entrenched in
the circuits' FCAjurisprudence. 75 The "tainted claims" doctrine is a wide net catching
many recipients of government funds, which should receive more attention.
The government and relators are increasingly bringing FCA claims based on the implied
certification theory and these cases are significantly expanding what constitutes a
false statement under the FCA. 76 For instance, relators have attempted to extend the
71

Id.

72

Id. at *9 (stating that "[t]here is substantial support for Relator's au,.5 mmu
Amendment applies to Medicaid claims through §
and Relator
Defendants knmvingly and
certified compliance vvith the Stark Amendment").

that

73
See Matthew, supra note 37, at 554-55 n. 193 ("It is equally clear that the [FCAJ was not
designed to reach every kind of fraud
on the Govenunent"); id.
at the time
suggest that the Act was intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification .... the court has
consistently refused to accept a rigid, restrictive reading.").

See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text , ---------n the circuits' ct1sag1·ee1me:11t on these
issues).
74

75

the FCA through a violation of a separate
statute, or law is referred to as
a ''tainted claim." See Matthew, supra note 37, at 533
the tainted-claims
the plaintiff
does not
the claim for payment itself is false or fraudulent, but rather the falsity or fraud is
supplied
the 'taint' of an entirely separate,
violation" of a separate
statute,
or law").
76

Susan C. Levy, Daniel J. Winters, & John R. Richards, The
Should The False Claims Act Reach Statements Never
38 PuB. CONT. L.J. 131, 135 (2008).
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FCA's jurisprudence to violations of nonbinding guidelines, manuals, and policies. 77
In addition, some circuits have accepted the more extensive reach of the FCA. For
example, some circuits do not require any type of nexus between the violation of a law
and the condition of payment for that government program. 78
There are a number of reasons behind the FCA's expanding reach. First, as noted in
the preceding paragraph, the courts do not always act as a barrier to expanded FCA
claims. 79 Second, in the 1980s, Congress lowered the FCA's scienter requirement from
"knowing" to "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" for the truth. 80 Third, and
possibly the most significant, the qui tam provision of the FCA provides strong financial
incentives for relators and the government to bring broad FCA claims.
Continuing off the last point, Congress created the FCA during the Civil War to
combat procurement fraud. From the FCA's inception, it incentivized private citizens
with knowledge of a fraud to come forward. 81 These incentives are by no means
inconsequential, either. Relators stand to gain as much as thirty percent of the damages
imposed on the defendant. 82 The qui tam provision distinguishes the FCA from the
SSA's antifraud provisions. The FCA is also significantly different from the Stark Laws,
which provide neither a private right of action nor the possibility for a private citizen to
be awarded for bringing a claim. The FCA's qui tam provision's incentives for private
citizens to report suspected fraud makes the FCA one of the most powerful and widely
used anti fraud provisions within the healthcare industry. 83
77 Id. at 139-40; but see Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 200l)(affirming summary
judgment on relator's attempt to bring a false claim based on nonbinding guidelines, manuals, and
policies).
78

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sanders v. East Ala. Healthcare Auth., 953 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D.
Ala. 1996) (holding that the defendant's alleged violation of state medical licensure requirementswhich had no direct relationship with Medicare or Medicaid payments-could serve as a valid basis
for a False Claims Act claim by submitting Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims); United
States v. Sci. Apps. Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that a government
contractor could be liable for submitting claims for payment while knowing that it violated
contractual provisions that are material to the government's decision to pay, even if the contract does
not specify that compliance with the contract term is a condition of payment).
79 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (listing the circuits that do not require a nexus between
the violation and a condition of the government's payment).

80

Phelps, supra note 3 9, at 1015.

81

Sanders, 953 F. Supp. at 1411; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Optimizing Qui Tam Litigation and
Minimizing Fraud and Abuse: A Comment on Christopher Alexion s Open the Door; Not the
Floodgates, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 419, 421 (2012) (stating that the qui tam provision was meant
to "encourage a rogue to catch a rogue.") (internal citations omitted).
82
See Joe Carlson, Stark Threat on Medicaid, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Aug. 10, 2013), https://www.
modernhealthcare.com/article/2013081O/MAGAZINE/308109971 ("[I]nsiders filing those cases
stood to gain as much as 30% of each settlement, giving them a strong incentive to file as broad
a lawsuit as possible for violations of the Stark law."); see also Matthew, supra note 37, at 528
("stating that [p]rivate plaintiffs are attracted to the FCA to challenge medical fraud because the qui
tam provision of the FCA rewards private parties who bring an action on behalf of the government
with up to a thirty percent share of the damages, penalties, or settlement proceeds recovered from
defendants").
83

See STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 16 at 9 (explaining that the "qui tam action has
been viewed as a powerful weapon against health care fraud ... [and the] popularity of qui tam
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The FCA also provides a financial incentive to the federal government. 84 The incentive
is straightforward; the government can apply its share of the proceeds, either from
court judgments or settlements, to future enforcement efforts. 85 The government has
the prosecutorial discretion to bring a Stark Law violation either under the actual Stark
Law provision or to "bootstrap" the Stark violation to an FCA claim. 86 The advantage
of bootstrapping a Stark violation into an FCA action is the possibility of receiving
financial awards under both provisions, which could bring "astronomical" recoveries
for the government. 87
The FCA's ever-expanding reach and significant financial incentives for relators and
the government makes it a prevalent, yet controversial, tool against healthcare fraud. 88
The FCA is controversial because, in many cases, it simply does not make sense for
physicians to challenge these allegations. 89 Not only do physicians risk paying penalties
actions brought under the FCA may be attributed partially to the fact that successful whistleblowers
can receive ... monetary proceeds"). In 2013, out of the 846-filed FCA cases, relators filed 752 of
them (more than any other year in history). In addition, relators earned more than $387 million in
awards. See 2013 Year-End False Claims Act Update, Publications, GrnsoN DuNN, (Jan. 8, 2014),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2013-year-end-false-claims-act-update.aspx.
84

See Matthew, supra note 37, at 529 (writing that "as long as [private prosecutors] are influenced
by their own financial self interest, government prosecutors threaten to do the same .... [and]
[e Jach enforcement agency reaps financial benefits both to the extent that the agency's deposits
are recognized for its enforcement accomplishments, and because the funds agencies collect
through enforcement are ultimately the source of appropriations used to finance future antifraud
enforcement."); see also Raspanti, supra note 33 at 26 (explaining that "the federal government is
recovering $15 for every $1 invested in FCA healthcare investigations and prosecutions.").
85

See Matthew supra note 37, at 528 (stating that "the government prefers to prosecute medical
fraud under the FCA because public prosecutors, like private qui tam plaintiffs, are rewarded by
being able to use their share in the proceeds form antifraud cases in future enforcement efforts.").
In 2013 alone, the government recovered $3.8 Billion in settlements and judgments under the FCA.
See 2013 Year-End False Claims Act Update, supra note 83.
86

"Bootstrapping" refers to use of the FCA to enforce another statutory violation in an attempt
to recover awards under both statutory provision. See Scott Withrow, Supplemental Compliance
Guidance Recommend Stark and Kickback Compliance Procedures, WITHROW, MCQUADE & OLSON,
LLP (June 20, 2004), http://www.wmolaw.com/?p=958 (explaining that the government may use the
FCA to increase its chances of recovering damages for the defendant's violation of another statutory
provision); see also Stephen G. Sozio, Health Care Reform Includes Aggressive Fraud Initiative:
HHS GIG, DOJ, and Congress Ramp Up Enforcement and Prevention Efforts, JONES DAY (April
2010), http://www.jonesday.com/health_care_reform_includes/.
87 See Withrow, supra note 86 (writing that "bootstrapping Stark ... into False Claims Act
violations allows qui tam relators to enforce Stark ... and adds monetary penalties of up to $11,000
per claim on top of already staggering [Stark] fines."); see also Sozio, supra note 86 (providing
that bootstrapping "can very quickly escalate potential liability into the $100 million range ... [i]
n addition, civil [FCA] penalties can involve up to $50,000 in fines and exclusion from federal
program participation ... [and] [a]dding [Stark] civil penalties of $5,500 to $11,000 per occurrence
lead to astronomical liability.").
88
Some commentators ask whether the FCA's expanding reach is a result of logic, congressional
intent, public policy, or pure self-interest. See Matthew, supra note 37, at 540, 556 (asking whether
increasingly broad FCA enforcement, with "no substantive legal limit," is in the public interest).
89

2013 Year-End False Claims Act Update, supra note 83 (stating that because of the enormous
costs associated with litigating and FCA claim "may defendants find that-even when they believe
the allegations are completely unfounded-it is too risky to take a case to trial").
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under two provisions, but they also run the risk of being excluded from the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. 90 Thus, physicians will likely settle FCA cases to avoid the
harshness of either of these two penalties.
If providers do challenge FCA claims, they may file a motion to dismiss, but are

unlikely to hold out until trial. 91 This is especially troublesome because, when
reviewing defendants' motions to dismiss, courts accept all factual allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. 92 As a result, courts will not fully consider
whether the defendant knew it was submitting a false claim; whether that defendant
caused the state to seek reimbursement for the false claim; whether the defendant
certified compliance with the Medicaid Stark Law; and, depending on the jurisdiction,
whether compliance with the Medicaid Stark law was a condition of payment by CMS
to the state Medicaid program. 93
For example, in all four cases discussed above, the courts found that the defendants may
have knowingly caused state Medicaid programs to submit false claims to the federal
government. The courts reached these conclusions even though Medicaid providers
probably were not aware, nor should they have been aware, 94 that the Medicaid Stark
Law prohibits them from making self-referrals or submitting claims to their states'
Medicaid programs. 95 Most specifically, the court in Schubert explicitly chose not to

90

See Grubman, supra note 22, at 11 (explaining that"[ f]ew civil healthcare fraud cases reach
litigation"); Laemmle-Weidenfeld & Kaufman, supra note 18, at 19 (predicting that weighty legal
issues "ultimately will be resolved simply by settlement."); DAVIDE. MATYAS ET AL., LEGAL IssuEs
IN HEALTHCARE FRAUD & ABUSE 227 (4th ed. 2012) (explaining that few healthcare organizations
will litigate FCA claims "for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to: the actual cost of
litigation; the fact that the government can exclude the entity from participation in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs pending the court's determination; and, for publicly traded companies or
companies entering into a corporate transaction (e.g., a merger or obtaining third-party financing),
the "black cloud" that an FCA case can bring to the organization").
91
Matyas et al., supra note 90; see also Solomson & McCutcheon, supra note 50 (stating that
"FCA actions almost never go to trial"); 2013 Year-End False Claims Act Update, supra note 83
(stating that because of the enormous costs associated with litigating FCA claims, "many defendants
find that-even when they believe the allegations are completely unfounded-it is too risky to take
a case to tiial").
92

U.S. ex rel. Schubert v. All Children's Health Sys., No. 8: l l-cv-1687-T-27EAJ, 2013 WL
6054803 at *6, 9 (M.D. Fla. April 29, 2013) (holding that the "Relator adequately allege[d] that
Defendants knowingly and falsely certified compliance with the Stark Amendment, and taking
the allegations in the light most favorable to the Relator, dismissal ... is inappropriate."); U.S. ex
rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv-1002-0rl-31DAB, 2012 WL 921147, *l (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 29, 2012) (reciting the standard ofreview for a motion to dismiss); U.S. ex rel. Parikh v.
Citizens Med. Ctr., 977 F. Supp. 2d 654, 661 (S.D. Tex 2013) (same).
93
See Laemmle-Weidenfeld & Kaufman, supra note 18 (arguing that courts must resolve the issues
of knowledge, causation, and conditions of payment before imposing liability, but ifthe parties
settle, these issues become "interesting but academic").
94

See Crane & Dunphy, supra note 40, at 1008 (explaining that the requisite scienter for a violation
of the FCA is "knowing," which includes "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard for the
truth"; also arguing that a Medicaid provider relying on CMS 's proposed rule cannot possess this
level of scienter); see also discussion infra Part IV
95

See supra Part H.B.
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consider whether the defendant's actions were based on a reasonable interpretation of
the Medicaid Stark law during the motion to dismiss stage. 96
Regarding causation, all four district courts concluded that the defendants may have
caused state Medicaid programs to submit false claims to the federal government. 97
As discussed in Part I, each year, the federal government uses a formula that compares
the state's average per capita income level with the national average income level to
determine how much funding 98 it will allocate to each state's Medicaid program. 99
However, courts, taking a liberal view of plaintiffs' allegations at the motion to dismiss
stage, have accepted as true that physicians may have caused state Medicaid program
to submit false claims to the federal government, without considering that claims made
by the states to the federal government are based on the Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage, and these claims are not affected by self-referring physicians' claims made
to the states. 100
Finally, regarding the FCA's falsity element, the four district courts simply concluded
that the defendants could have certified compliance with the Medicaid Stark law. 101
This reasoning is flawed because unlike Medicare providers, who explicitly certify
compliance with a number of statutes and regulations, including the Medicare Stark
Law, when submitting cost reports and forms, 102 Medicaid providers do not explicitly
certify compliance with Medicaid Stark Law. 103 The courts, however, were not willing
to sort the technical differences between the defendants' explicit certifications within the
Medicare and Medicaid contexts during a motion to dismiss stage. 104
96 See US. ex rel. Schubert v. All Children's Health Sys., 2013 WL 1651811 at *8-9 (M.D. Fla.
April 29, 2013).
97

See supra Part H.B.

98

Otherwise known as Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). See supra note 14.

99

See supra note 14.

100

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

101

US. ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Med. Ctr. 2012 WL 921147, 1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2012)
(holding that "falsely ce1iifying compliance vvith Stark in com1ection \Vith a claim submitted to a
federally funded insurance program is actionable under the FCA"); US. ex rel. Osheroffv. Tenet
Healthcare Corp., 2013 WL 1289260, 1, n. 1 (S.D. Fla. March 27, 2013) (finding that alleging that
the defendant certified compliance with the Medicaid Stark law by accepting a Medicare Provider
Agreement and submitting annual cost reports was "enough to ground a claim under the False
Claims Act"); US. ex rel. Parikh v. Citizens Med. Ctr., 977 F Supp. 2d 654, 664 (S.D. Tex 2013)
(accepting argument that the defendant expressly certified compliance "ith the Medicaid Stark
law by submitting Medicare forms); US. ex rel. Schubert v. All Children's Health Sys., 2013
WL 6054803 at *8 (M.D. Fla. November 15, 2013) (proclaiming that "compliance with the Stark
Amendment is undoubtedly a prerequisite to the govermnent's payment" for Medicaid providers.").
102
See, e.g, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVICES, OMB No. 0938-0685, MEDICARE ENROLLMENT APPLICATION: INSTITUTIONAL PROVIDERS,
CMS 885A, Section 13.A.3., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Fonns/CMS-Forms/downloads/
cms855a.pdf
103

See, e.g, Tenet, 2013 WL 2871264 at *6 (finding that defendant's certification of compliance
through its Medicaid provider agreements was enough to support a FCA action).
104

All defendants in the district court cases were both Medicare and Medicaid providers. See
Halifax, 2012 WL at * l; Tenet, 2013 WL 1289260, at *1; Parikh, 977 F Supp. 2d at 660; Schubert,
2013 WL 6054803 at *L
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This Section highlighted both the dangers and the potency of the FCA. The everexpanding prosecutorial use by the government and individual relators, the likelihood of
settlement to occur prior to fleshing out some of the more fact intense inquiries, and the
inconsistent and confusing case law behind the false certification theory are the more
apparent problems of the FCA's jurisprudence.

III.A STARK CONTRAST TO CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
All four district courts' holdings were in contrast to congressional intent. First, although
the plain language of the statute says otherwise, the district courts used Medicaid Stark
law to sanction individual physicians. 105 Second, the courts permitted a violation of the
Medicaid Stark law to support a private right of action under the FCA, even though the
Medicaid Stark law does not include any such private right of action. 106
A. The Medicaid Stark Law
The Medicare Stark law's plain language does not empower the federal government
to take action against individual Medicaid providers. 107 At most, the language is
ambiguous and Congress has authorized CMS to interpret the language and achieve
uniform regulation and enforcement. 108 However, CMS failed to finalize the proposed
rule that would have provided such clarity for Medicaid physicians. 109
Although CMS 's proposed rule was never finalized, it is supported by general principles
of statutory construction. Courts generally presume that Congress "says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says." 110 Congress adhered to this cardinal canon
of statutory construction when it intentionally passed two different statutes - Medicare
Stark and Medicaid Stark-to create two different sets oflegal obligations. 111 Congress'
105
!0 6

See
See

HA
H.B.

107
See Carlson, supra note 82 (explaining that "[r]ather than denying payments to Medicaid
providers who violate the Stark law, the 1993 law directed the CMS to withhold from the state
Medicaid program the federal matching prniion of any claim that violates Stark.").
108
See Chevron U.S.A. lnc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (providing
that the "Constitution vests the responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of ... policy choices
and resolving the strnggle between competing views of the public interest ... in the political
branches."); see also Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine ofHard Cases, 66 ADMIN. L. REv.
285, 287 n. 3 (2014) (explaining that "Congress is presumed to delegate" agencies the authority
to resolve ambiguities in statutory meaning) (internal citation omitted); see also Delegation and
Individual Liberties, JUSTIA, http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article- l/03-delegation-oflegislative-power.html (explaining that "administration of the law requires exercise of discretion,
and that 'in our increasingly complex society, replete \Vith ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under road general
directives.").
109

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.

YULE K.JM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
RECENT TRENDS 4 (2008).
llO

111
See Laemmle-Weidenfeld & Kaufman, supra note 18 (suggesting that because "Medicaid has
its own unique set of coverage requirements, a State can cover and reimburse DHS very differently
from the way these services are covered and reimbursed under the Medicare progran1[, therefore,]
CMS concluded that Congress was aware of these differences and that the statutory language was
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choice to use different language in each of the two Stark Laws illustrates this intent.
Specifically, Congress' choice of language in the Medicare Stark law unambiguously
prohibits physicians from making self-referrals. 112 In contrast, in the Medicaid Stark
Law, Congress unambiguously bans the federal government from reimbursing the
States for self-referrals. 113 By negative implication, Congress did not intend to prohibit
Medicaid physicians from making self-referrals like it had in the Medicare Stark law. 114
The canon of negative implication is strongest, as is the case here, when the same
Congress created the two statutory provisions. 115 In the present case, the same
Congress enacted both the Medicare and Medicaid Stark laws in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993. 116 If Congress meant to create the same prohibition ofselfreferrals in both statutes, it presumably could have used the same language in both.
Instead, Congress decided to extend the impact of Medicare Stark law, i.e., prohibiting
the federal government from subsidizing self-referring physicians, to Medicaid Stark
law. 117 There is no indication that Congress meant to mandate the very same prohibition
of self-referrals on Medicaid providers than it did for Medicare providers. Congress,
instead, left the determination of how to deal with self-referring Medicaid physicians
up to the states. 118
Actions by later iterations of Congress support this conclusion. In the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) of 2010, Congress required CMS to establish a Medicare Self-Referral
Disclosure Protocol (SRDP), which enables Medicare providers to self-disclose actual
or potential violations of Stark Law. 119 In return, the ACA authorizes the Secretary of the
Health and Human Services (HHS) to reduce the fines for violations of Stark Law as an
incentive to self-report. 120 On its face, however, the SRDP created by CMS applies only

intended to provide CMS 'some flexibility' in applying the Stark Law's prohibitions in the Medicaid
context.").
112

See 42 US.C. § 1395nn ("[T]he physician may not make a referral.").

113

See 42 US.C. § 1396b(s) ("No payment shall be made lo a State.").

114

See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 US. 200, 206 (1993) ("Where Congress includes
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another .... it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion"); see also
Laemmle-Weidenfeld & Kaufman, supra note 18 ("Nothing in the [Stark Medicaid law] permits
the state Medicaid agencies to deny payments to the DHS providers on the basis of the providers'
financial relationships with physicians, even ifthat information were available to the Medicaid
agencies. Nor did CMS at any time propose including such prohibitions in their regulations. States
would need to enact their mvn laws to accomplish that.").
115
See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 US. 320, 330 (1997) (explaining that if Congress considered the two
provisions "simultaneously," Congress's action was more likely intentional).
116

See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text

117

See Laemmle-Weidenfeld & Kaufman, supra note 18.

118

The title of the Medicaid Stark law, "Payment to States," also supports this theory. 42 US.C.
§1396b(s). See also INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, 502 US. 183, 189-90 (1991)
(stating that the title of a statute "can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation text").
119

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND J'vfEDICAJD SERVICES,
OMB No. 0938-1106, CMS Vou1NTARY SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, http://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/6409 _SRDP _Protocol. pdf.
120

Id.
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to Medicare providers but not to Medicaid providers. 121 In fact, CMS's guidance "does
not even acknowledge the possibility of resolving Medicaid-related claims." 122 Applying
the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius 123 , Congress' application of this program
to Medicare physicians, but not Medicaid physicians, shows that Congress did not intend
for CMS to take regulatory action against Medicaid physicians for self-referrals.
B. The FCA and Stark Law

Using the FCA as a vehicle to bring enforcement actions for Stark Law violations is
contrary to congressional intent. 124 First, the courts' acquiescence of the FCA's qui tam
provision for Stark violations is contrary to the very fabric used to create the Stark
Laws. 125 Stark Law (Medicare or Medicaid) does not contain a private right of action. 126
Moreover, the Stark Laws' legislative history suggests that an implied private cause of
action is contrary to Congress' intent. 127 The legislative history shows that the Stark
laws were meant to strengthen the Government's ability to detect and prosecute fraud,
not to empower individual relators. 128
Second, the ACA amended the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) to codify the use of the
FCA for AKS violations, which expressly extended the FCA's private right of action to
the AKS. 129 Applying expressio uni us est exclusio alterius, Congress's decision to create
this provision under the AKS and not under the Stark Laws provides strong evidence
that Congress did not intend to extend the FCA to Stark Law violations.
121
See Laemmle-Weidenfeld & Kaufman, supra note 18 (writing that "[o]n its face and, as
we understand it, also in practice, the SRDP is available only for the resolution of Medicare
overpayments resulting form claims resulting form Stark violations").
122 Id.
123
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)(explaining that this Latin phrase means that "to
express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative").
124
See Matthew, supra note 37, at 573 (stating that the judicial acquiescence of the implication of
the FCA tln-ough Stark violations resulted in a "in a chaotic departure ... from Congress's original
objectives"); id at 528 (explaining that these cases "extend the scope of the FCA far beyond what
Congress intended, and abandon the detailed statutory approach to controlling the medical fraud that
Congress designed under the ... self-referral laws").
125 Id. at 566 (stating that the plain language of the statutes and supporting congressional
documents make it clear Congress intended to set forth an exclusively public administrative
enforcement structure for the antifraud laws); id.at 568 (stating the application of the tainted-claims
theory "belie the wisdom of government oversight where ... [Stark law] cases are concerned");
id. at 572 ("Congress made no mention and did not even acknowledge a place for private-party
enforcement of the antifraud statutes."); id at 573 ("[A]t no time has Congress sanctioned private
enforcement of these statutes. To the extent that the tainted-claims approach does so, it is contrary to
Congress's intent").
126

West Allis Mem'l Hosp., v. Bowen, 852 F2d 251, 255 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that Congress
did not intend to provide a private cause of action); see also Matthew, supra note 37 at 528 ("By
allowing antifraud enforcement to proceed under the FCA, the tainted-claims approach creates a
private cause of action where Congress has not")
127
H.R REP. No. 95-393(III) (1977), reprinted in 1977 US.C.CAN. 3039, 3040 (reporting that
Congress's intent was to "strengthen the capability of the Government to detect, prosecute, and
punish fraudulent activities under Medicare and Medicaid programs") (emphasis added).
128 Id
129

See 42 US.C. § 1320a-7b(g).
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In conclusion, the four district court opinions directly contravene congressional intent.
Medicaid physicians do not violate the Medicaid Stark law by making self-referrals. 130
In addition, the Medicaid Stark law is not an appropriate basis for an FCA claim. The
following Part will provide various recommendations to Medicaid physicians, courts,
and CMS to help align these two lines of thought.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Medicaid providers have little guidance on whether Medicaid Stark law can be used
as an enforcement tool against them. 131 CMS 's proposed rule, although relied on by
the healthcare industry for over a decade, has provided no persuasive value to the four
district courts. The four district courts, instead, disregarded CMS 's intended, yet never
finalized, regulatory framework, and defied congressional intent. Two factors allowed
for this result: first, CMS failed to finalize its 1998 rule and second, the courts accepted
Medicaid Stark law as a basis for FCA claims. These recommendations intend to
address both.
A. Recommendations to CMS

A final rule by CMS would resolve the problems discussed in this Article in two
ways. First, Medicaid physicians who comply with CMS 's final regulation would ipso
facto comply with Medicaid Stark law. Consider, for example, CMS 's proposal for
reporting requirements discussed in Part I. Assuming CMS applies the same reporting
requirements as promulgated in its proposed rule, Medicaid physicians would be
required to report their financial relationships and self-referrals to the states. As long
as Medicaid physicians reported financial relationships and self-referrals to their states,
courts could not conceivably find that Medicaid physicians, even those making selfreferrals, violated the Medicaid Stark law.
Second, neither the DOJ nor qui tam relators would successfully allege FCA violations
based on the Medicaid Stark law. 132 Continuing with the example above, Medicaid
physicians would insulate themselves from submitting, or causing states to submit false
claims simply by reporting all financial relationships to their states. Medicaid physicians,
under the same analysis made in the previous paragraph, would be in full compliance
with the Medicaid Stark law. As a result, the DOJ and qui tam relators could not allege
that Medicaid physicians falsely certified compliance with the Medicaid Stark law.
Unfortunately, CMS has not finalized its proposed reporting requirements or any
other information that would clarify the ambiguities in the Medicaid Stark law. These
could violate the statute
information to the State Medicaid program or to the States. This requm~1m:nt, however,
at this
due to CMS 's failure to finalize the rpr,rn-tmn requlfc:menls.
131
See Carlson, supra note 82 \ cAµ1am111x
statute's scope); Matthew, supra note 37, at 546
such a
level
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ambiguities allow courts to interpret the law as they deem fit. As discussed in this
Article, the problems with FCAjurisprudence, especially at the early motion to dismiss
stage, may not produce logical outcomes or the results Congress intended. 133 Therefore,
this Article recommends that CMS should step up to the plate and finalize its 1998
proposed rule.
B. Recommendations to Medicaid Physicians

There is a strong possibility that CMS will not unilaterally act to finalize its 1998
proposed rule. 134 Fortunately, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides two
ways Medicaid physicians can seek to compel CMS to finalize its rule. First, a Medicaid
physician, under section 706(1) of the APA, could ask a court to compel CMS to finalize
its 1998 proposed rule. 135 A court, however, will generally compel agency action only if
it is shown that the agency has violated a "clear" or "non-discretionary" duty to act. 136
In this case, Congress neither provided a timeline nor specifically directed CMS to act.
Moreover, courts generally refuse to tell an agency how to allocate its resources among
an agency's competing priorities. 137 As a practical matter, this choice would likely be
costly and unfruitful.

133
As the Medicaid Stark law stands, the true intent of Congress will only be carried out if CMS
takes action. If, however, Congress wants to change the law in order to reflect an acquiescence of
the FCA's use and private cause of action for the Medicaid Stark law, then Congress needs to make
an amendment to the Medicaid Stark law provisions like it did with the AKS. See supra note 129
and accompanying text. In fact, Congress attempted to do exactly this in May 2014. The Medicaid
Physician Self-Referral Act was introduced in May 2014, which explicitly prevented State Medicaid
programs from making a payment to a Medicaid physician who made self-referrals. See Medicaid
Physician Self-Referral Act of 2014, H.R. 4676, 113th Cong. (2014). Moreover, the bill codified that
a violation of Stark constitutes a false or fraudulent claim that is a sufficient basis for FCA liability
as well as a private cause of action. § 2(c). The bill, however, died in the same Congress. See www.
govtrack. us/congress/bills/ l 13/hr467 6.
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It is even possible that CMS is conceding the issue and is in accord with the DOJ's position.
According to one article, "a spokeswoman [for CMS] confirmed ... in an e-mail to Modem
Healthcare that the CMS does consider the Stark law applicable to Medicaid claims, even though it
has never published final rules on how it would work." See Carlson, supra note 82.
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5 US.C. § 706(1 ). The APA gives the court the authority to review "agency action." See 5 US.C.
§ 704. Agency action includes not only affirmative action, but also an agency's "failure to act." See
5 US.C. § 551(13). The APA provides at least two limitations on a court's ability to review agency
action. Frist, a statute may preclude judicial review; and second, agency action may be committed to
agency discretion by law. See 5 US.C. § 70l(a)(l)-(2). Section 706 of the APA lays out the standard
of review, and provides that "a reviewing court [can] compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed." See 5 US.C. § 706(1). n.
136
Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review ofAdministrative Agency Action and
Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. LJ 461, 465 (2008) (citing San Francisco Baykeeper v. Whitman, 297
F3d 877, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union v. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, 145 F3d 120, 124 (3rd Cir. 2008) (refusing to compel agency
action under section 706( 1) where there was no "inaction that is either contrary to a specific
Congressional mandate, in violation of a specific court order, or unduly transgressive of the agency's
own tentative deadlines").
137

Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review a/Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79
NYU L REv. 1657 (2004) (arguing that"[ a]n agency's decision about how to allocate its resources
among competing priorities is at the core of the policymaking discretion that the executive branch
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There is a second option, on the other hand, that would provide the industry an
opportunity for relief. Under section 553(e) of the APA, Medicaid physicians may
petition CMS to finalize its 1998 rule and under section 555(e) of the APA, CMS is
required to give prompt notice of its decision. 138 One of two scenarios would then play
out. First, CMS could agree with the petition and finalize the rule. That is obviously the
best-case scenario. The other, and more likely situation, is for CMS to deny the petition.
In this case, the Medicaid physicians could challenge CMS 's denial.
The courts' scope of review, however, is very narrow and limited to ensuring that the
agency has adequately explained the relevant facts and policy concerns it relied on in
making the decision, and that the facts have some basis in the record. 139 Regardless,
this would engage CMS in a cost-effective way. Additionally, it may benefit Medicaid
physicians who are facing FCA charges stemming from the Medicaid Stark law in court.
Filing a petition will force CMS to actively decide whether or not to issue a final rule.
Forcing CMS to be actively engaged may provide sufficient weight for the court to stay
or dismiss the case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
C. Recommendations to the Courts

Over two hundred years ago, Chief Justice Marshall unequivocally stated "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial to say what the law is." 140 This
statement, however, has been qualified by the rise of our current administrative state.
Due to the ever-increasing complexity of the administrative framework, agencies must
resolve statutory ambiguities in a uniform and workable manner. 141 Congress and the
courts recognize that agencies possess special knowledge and expertise that are suited
for resolving these ambiguities. This Article highlights the need for an agency to
promulgate regulations to ensure clarity and uniformity for its regulated beneficiaries in
the face of a complex and ambiguous regulatory framework.

of the government and any administrative agency must have.); see also Biber, supra note 136 at
472 (noting that courts afford agencies a varying level of deference because a court should not
"substitute its discretion for that of an administrative agency and thus exercise administrative
duties") (internal citations omitted).
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5 US.C. § 555(e) (providing that an agency is required to
"prompt notice ... of [a] denial .
. . of a .
. .. made in connection with any agency proceeding ... [and] the notice shall be
accompanied
a brief statement of the grounds for denial.").
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See Massachusetts v. E.PA, 549 US. 497, 527 (2007) (explaining that the scope of review for an
agency's denial of a petition is narrow and that an agency has broad discretion to choose how best to
marshal its limited resomces).
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Marbmyv. Madison, 5 US. 137, 177 (1803).
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See Liu, supra note 108, 287 n. 3 (explaining that "Congress is presumed to
agencies
the authority to resolve ambiguities in statutory meaning);
and Individual Liberties,
supra note l 08
that the Supreme Comt "has long recognized that administration of the
law
exercise of discretion, and that 'in om ""-''""""1''Y
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do
to
power under road general directives.");
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CMS 's failure to finalize its 1998 proposed rule has opened the door for courts'
inconsistent handling of the Medicaid Stark law and the FCA. 142 For example, the four
district court cases would have had different outcomes if they had fallen in a jurisdiction
that had already rejected the implied false certification theory. In addition, the costs
associated with challenging an FCA claim and the likelihood of settlement limited the
judiciary's ability to resolve the factual issues that would have prevented the outcome of
the four district court cases.
This Article recommends that courts should apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine
to either stay or dismiss these cases until CMS finalizes the 1998 proposed rule. The
primary jurisdiction doctrine allows courts to use their prudential discretion to defer an
issue to the expertise of administrative agency to, among other things, ensure uniformity
in the law. 143 Staying or dismissing these cases could place additional pressure on CMS
to finalize its 1998 rule to ensure that a uniform regulatory framework is established. 144

CONCLUSION
The issues presented in this Article highlight the need for clarity and uniformity within
the regulatory framework of the SSA. CMS's failure to finalize its 1998 proposed rule
has allowed courts to create inconsistent case law at the expense of Medicaid physicians.
In addition, the use of the FCA to sanction self-referring Medicaid physicians is contrary
to congressional intent. Congress did not intend to prohibit Medicaid physicians from
making self-referrals the same way it did to Medicare physicians. Instead, Congress
intended to extend the impact of the Medicare Stark law by prohibiting the federal
government from making certain payments to the States. Moreover, Congress did not
intend to create a private right of action under the Stark Laws.
These issues presented in this Article should be addressed by CMS and not by the
judiciary. The judiciary's contribution to this body of law has resulted in numerous
problems, which demonstrate that the judiciary is not the appropriate body to resolve
these issues. 145 Instead, CMS, the entity charged with the oversight of the healthcare
industry; the entity with the specialized knowledge and expertise to create a navigable
and uniform regulatory framework; and the entity that already begun the rulemaking
process is the entity that should be required to resolve this issue to best line with
congressional intent.
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See Matthew, supra note 37, at 545
reasons various courts have
or declined
to find FCA
... cannot be reconciled and therefore
no clear instruction for future
conduct.").
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See Aaron J Lockwood, The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: Cornv,etir1z S11amtants
64 WASH. & LEE L REv. 707 (2007)
that the doctrine
administrative
to utilize their
and resolve critical issues); see also United States
v. W Pac. RR Co., 352 US. 59 (1956) l'"'"v",uu.,m,; that the doctrine has "no fixed fonnula," but is

Review,
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See Matthew, supra note 37, at 533
that "no court should entertain a tainted-claims
case until after [the government] has first exercised
under the ... administrative
TwomoTono of the
antifraud laws.").
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In conclusion, CMS should finalize its 1998 rule. Medicaid physicians, in order to
initiate the rulemaking process, should petition CMS to finalize its rule. Finally, the
judiciary should use its prudential discretion to either stay or dismiss any Medicaid
Stark law case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine and until CMS finalizes the rule.
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